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The relation between chaos and order in social systems has been a recurring theme in educational literature over the last decade. Discussions
commonly propose links with developments in mathematics and physics. The authors take a critically constructive look at some of the
fundamental questions that underlie the discussion. They look at the nature of the relevant developments in mathematics and physics in
their possible relation to educational theory and practice. They proceed to explore the role of order, predictability and control and the place
of religion in the education systems, and in academic discourse, of today's pluralist societies.
 
Introduction
The relation between chaos and order in social systems, often linked
with discussions of complexity and systems theory, has been a recur-
ring theme in educational literature over the last decade. It continues
to have an influential place. These discussions have been located in a
variety of contexts. 
For instance, Badenhorst (1993; 1995), Spector (1993), Claassen
(1994), Badenhorst and Claassen (1995), Stuart (1995) and Van
Niekerk (1996) locate them in the framework of postmodernism and
education, Letseka (1995) and Treml (1995) in the context of systems
theory, and Stoker (1996) in the context of physics. More recently,
Brown and Moffett (1999) use the themes of the "new science, chaos
theory and systems thinking" in developing the framework for a
practice-focused treatment of school transformation.
The discussions raise important issues for educational theory and
practice, especially in situations of change. They challenge us to new
ways of thinking about education, and social reality in general, by
offering new frameworks for that thinking. 
At times the discussion is loaded with esoteric terminology, as is
frankly acknowledged by Treml (1995) in his treatment of systems
theory pedagogics; a discussion that ranges widely over such issues as
functionality, complexity, contingency, selectivity, intentionality and
interdisciplinarity with the tendency for complexities to rearrange
themselves in times of crisis or adversity. Claassen's discussion (1994)
is less dense, raising questions of relativism, subjectivism, unpredicta-
bility, randomness, emergence, self-organisation and the elusiveness
of truth; yet, in this case also, we are invited to explore these often fa-
miliar concepts within a new way of understanding the educational
environment that requires a significant shift in thinking about edu-
cation.
Even though the discussion is, at times, characterised by a daunt-
ing technical complexity, it raises challenges that no serious educator
can afford to ignore. Neither can we afford to limit ourselves to the
more readily accessible presentations that avoid the technical com-
plexities in order to concentrate on practical implications. In this case,
there is too much danger of misinterpretation and distortion through
an inadequate appreciation of the new frame of reference within which
familiar words are to be understood.
If educational discourse in this area is to advance educational
practice, it is important that the context of the relevant developments
in science is understood adequately and the assumptions of links be-
tween that science, on the one hand, and educational theory and prac-
tice, on the other, are examined critically. 
The scope and purpose of this article
We propose to take a critically constructive look at fundamental
questions that underlie the discussion, focusing particularly on the
question of chaos and order. Our purpose is to test and strengthen the
foundations for an effective analysis of issues of chaos and order in
social systems, with special reference to education.
In proposing a critical approach we do not presuppose "better
knowledge" (Treml, 1995:271). It seems to us that a presupposition of
better knowledge is more likely to generate a dogmatic rather than a
genuinely critical approach. By a critical approach we mean one that
tests the foundations of knowledge claims in order to judge whether
these claims are sustainable in the form in which they are presented.
In speaking of a testing of foundations we are not espousing founda-
tionalism. We do not believe that there is any set of universal, self-
evident beliefs that can form a universally recognised basis for
knowledge claims. What we are concerned to do is to bring into clear
view the foundations, or the basis, for the making of particular know-
ledge claims so that we, and others, can make an informed judgment
on the soundness of these foundations and, hence, the validity of the
claims. 
Links with mathematics and the physical sciences
A common assumption underlying the various discussions is that
theories in physics and mathematics provide an appropriate framework
for the analysis of social systems. The new models of physical reality
generated by theories in physics, together with "chaos theory" in ma-
thematics, are taken as the appropriate basis for the analysis of social
reality. 
In view of this, it is important to explore carefully two questions
in order to engage effectively in the discussion. Firstly, what precisely
do current theories in mathematics and the physical sciences tell us
about chaos and order in physical reality? Secondly, what is the rele-
vance of this for the development of social theories? 
Chaos and order in mathematics and the physical sciences
In the educational discussion we encounter such claims as "what is
chaotic is a source of order" (Letseka, 1995:301); "Disorder can be a
source of order" (Brown & Moffett, 1999:21); "complex systems ...
contain both order and chaos" (Badenhorst, 1995:13). These state-
ments are commonly presented as supported by the assured findings
of the physical sciences and mathematics, and commonly linked, in
particular, to "chaos theory".
Whilst such descriptions are not altogether inaccurate, they can
be seriously misleading when applied to the context of social reality,
unless the specific technical meaning that "chaos" has in this context
is made very clear. As Badenhorst (1995:13) observes, citing Hayles,
researchers in the area generally prefer such terms as "non-linear dyna-
mics" or "dynamical systems theory" as more accurately identifying
their area of investigation than "chaos theory". 
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Contrary to the common use of the word, the "chaos" of chaos
theory is not a state of disorder. The use of the term chaotic systems
already indicates that a form of order is being investigated, since any
system is, by definition, orderly. These systems are described as
chaotic systems not because they are disorderly but because of their
unpredictability. We are accustomed to think of an orderly world as
one that enables us to predict outcomes; "if an object with specified
properties moving at a specified velocity strikes a sheet of glass having
specified properties then the glass will shatter". 
In education, the assumption of such ordered predictability gives
confidence that, if we create the right conditions, we can be sure of
achieving our educational goals. The unsettling thing about recent de-
velopments in mathematics and the physical sciences is that they cast
doubt on the validity of this assumption. They do not, however, cast
doubt on the fundamental orderliness of the world.
As Polkinghorne, a mathematical physicist (1991:36), observes,
the relevant chaotic systems exhibit, in the unpredictability of their
most "chaotic" elements, a decided orderliness. This leads him to
speak of "an orderly disorder ... That is why chaos theory was not a
well-chosen name." Later (1991:39) he speaks of the "structured cha-
os" of such systems. Note that he is not speaking of an order existing
alongside or interacting with the chaotic but of an order within the
chaotic itself. He does speak (1991:37) of "the emergence of order out
of chaos" but this is not the "chaos" of everyday discourse cha-
racterised by an absence of all order; it is "chaos" in the limited, tech-
nical sense of an absence of ordered predictability.
Chaos theory comes together with developments in physics to
compel us to review our conception of order. The physicist Paul Da-
vies argues that our present state of knowledge about the physical
world requires us to think of it as characterised by contingent order
with "various laws and regularities". It is a world in which we encoun-
ter (1992:182) complex open systems that, whilst unpredictable and
"indeterministic", unmistakably "display ordered and lawlike beha-
viour". In such systems (1992:193), we may say "that there is order in
disorder", not that there is an absence of order. 
What we are faced with, then, is not an interaction of two fun-
damentally different principles, "order" and "chaos", but a kind of or-
der fundamentally different from the traditional conception of order in
western thought. In that traditional conception order is necessarily
characterised by necessity and predictability. The order we encounter
in today's world of physics and non-linear dynamics is characterised
by contingency rather than necessity, unpredictability rather than
predictability, and a dynamic, non-linear causality rather than linear
causality. 
In discussions of education and social order, therefore, it is im-
portant, when appealing to these findings in physics and mathematics,
to make very clear the nature of the "chaos" that is involved. A failure
to do so is liable to result in an invalid use of these findings in support
of theories of order and chaos in the social order. It also tends to
obscure the more important issue raised by these developments: the
existence of more than one kind of order in our world. 
Education, social order and physical theory
Once we have a clear view of the relevant mathematics and physical
theory, the question still remains: How does this relate to education
and the social order? Much of the discussion appears to assume that a
theoretical model of the physical world provides an assured scientific
basis for social analysis. 
This is, at best, an assumption that needs to be argued rather than
taken for granted, as it so often is in educational discussions of order
and chaos. It is possible, of course, to mount an intellectually
respectable — though not necessarily persuasive — argument in sup-
port of this position, but it is also possible to mount an equally re-
spectable — and, we believe, more persuasive — argument for a ne-
gative answer.
Gadamer, for example, (1993:552) while expressing a high regard
for science,1 argues persuasively that the illegitimate intrusion of sci-
ence into social theory and practice stands in the way of a proper un-
derstanding of social issues. "In a time when science penetrates further
and further into social practice, science can fulfil its social function
only when it acknowledges its own limits and the conditions placed on
its freedom to maneuver. Philosophy must make this clear to an age
credulous about science to the point of superstition."
Gadamer's warning finds echoes in Toulmin's discussion (1982)
on the distinction between scientific theories and scientific myths. Sci-
entific theories are the assured findings of science. They are authori-
tative only within the limited scope of the relevant field of scientific
investigation within which they are developed. A scientific myth, on
the other hand, is the result of the use of scientific concepts "not to
explain anything, but for other purposes — for instance, as the raw
material of myths." (Toulmin, 1982:32). Toulmin's use of the word
"myth" is in no way pejorative. He uses it as a term for the comprehen-
sive frame of reference that we all need to give coherence to our ex-
periences. 
His concern is with the practice of basing a myth on scientific
concepts in ways that give the myth an appearance of scientific au-
thority that it does not have. He does not argue that science should
have no part in the development of a myth. Indeed, his work concludes
with a strong plea for a collaborative endeavour in the construction of
a new myth that takes full account of developments in science (1982:
270-274). His concern is with the blurring of the distinction between
scientific theory and myth so as to give a false scientific authority to
the myth. 
Toulmin's distinction is relevant to the discussion of order and
chaos in education. "Chaos theory" and related theories in physics
have been developed as answers to problems in the physical world.
They have clear scientific authority in relation to these problems. They
have no assured scientific authority in relation to problems of order in
educational and social relations. If we choose to use them as a frame-
work for social and educational analysis we need to recognise, and
make it clear, that they are now functioning as myth, not as science,
and have no scientific authority. 
Implications for educational practice
Whilst we have these reservations about the way in which chaos theory
and related developments in physics are sometimes used in discussions
of social and educational issues, we do not doubt that the changing
conceptions of order in the physical world do have implications for
education. Whilst the physical theories do not provide us with assured
scientific answers to the relevant social and educational theories, they
raise issues that responsible educators cannot ignore.
Issues of order, predictability and control
Since thinking about social order has long been dominated by the same
monolithic conception of order that dominated the physical sciences,
the discrediting of that conception by findings in the physical world
clearly calls for a rethinking of the conception of social order, in-
cluding the ordered relations of education. 
Educational practice has commonly proceeded, and often still
does proceed, on the assumption that predictable educational outcomes
can be achieved by the consistent application of scientifically based
forms of control. Teaching strategies and techniques carrying a "scien-
tific design" label are promoted, and adopted, as the teacher's tools for
manipulating the educational situation to achieve assured educational
goals. An appropriate learning environment is seen as one that is con-
trolled by the teacher to achieve an ordered environment that ensures
effective learning.  
Whatever justification may be offered for this practice, it is clear
______________________
1
Whilst the re is  a case for regarding all academic disciplines as science, for the sake
of conv enie nce  in the present discussion, the word “science”, in line with common
usage, is to be taken as referring to the “natural sciences” unless otherwise specified.
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that it cannot be justified by appeal to scientific conceptions of order.
Any such appeal can only be to an outdated science. On the other
hand, when we turn to educational research, we find ample evidence
that this conception of educational order fails to offer the optimum
learning environment. On the contrary, it inhibits learning by repres-
sing creative learning potential that is intrinsically unpredictable in its
operation. 
The work on learning styles, represented by, among others,
Sternberg (1997), McCarthy (1987), and Gregorc (1985), directs our
attention to the diversity of ways in which people learn. In doing so it
casts serious doubt on any idea that the best learning environment is
one in which order is secured by tight control that channels learning
into a single, logically sequenced process. It calls for an open environ-
ment that encourages creative diversity.
The work on multiple intelligences, spearheaded by Gardner
(1993), invites us to recognise more ways of intelligently — hence
rationally — ordering our experiences than by the logic of mathema-
tical and verbal systems. These remain important, of course, but room
needs to be made for others if we are to have the benefit of the full
range of human intelligence. Again, the indications are that an effec-
tive learning environment is one of creative diversity rather than con-
trolled order.
We might add to this the evidence that much creative thought
does not conform to the neatly sequenced pattern of ordered thought
that has commonly been taught in schools as the norm for disciplined
thinking. Roger Penrose, the distinguished Oxford mathematician,
points out (1989:418-425) that his own creative thinking in mathema-
tics does not follow any such logically ordered pattern. Rather the
creative elements in his mathematical thinking typically arise as sud-
den, inspirational flashes of insight that have no apparent causal con-
nection in the thought processes that follow a linear logic. He supports
this with references to the testimony of other leading figures in mathe-
matics and the physical sciences to the same effect.
It seems clear, then, that there is a need for a fundamental re-
thinking of the issue of order in formal educational relationships. This
does not mean that we need to jettison all the old strategies and tea-
ching practices as worthless. Many of these are still likely to have a
valued place in the new order. 
What we need is a new conception of educational order that is
more flexible and open to allow for the diversity of learning styles and
thinking processes that we now know to characterise human learning.
We need to move away from an order that is achieved by a teacher-
prescribed order in the learning process. We need to move towards the
ordering of learning around a problem-oriented focus, allowing room
for a diversity of student-initiated learning processes within the dis-
cipline of this focus. We need to welcome the unexpected and unpre-
dictable, not as disruptions to the orderly progress of learning, but as
welcome opportunities for learning about a world that is always able
to surprise us.
And we need to decisively abandon all idea of the teacher's role
as a controller producing a controlled order in the learning situation.
Rather, we need to see that role more as that of a flexible, open guide
enabling students to make sense of an ordered, yet often unpredictable,
world. The teacher must reject the role of oracle providing authorita-
tive answers to become a guide showing students how to find answers;
including finding the meaning of those human actions that bring dis-
ruption and disorder into the experienced world. 
This shift in the conception of educational order is demanded of
us if educational practice is to fit all we now know of the nature of our
world, both from scientific explorations of the physical world and from
systematic investigations of human intelligence and learning. 
The issue of religious pluralism 
The second area in which the changed conception of order in the phy-
sical world calls for a rethinking of educational practice is the issue of
religious pluralism. The existence in a society of a plurality of reli-
gious convictions, is a fundamental feature of modern societies. This
creates potential for social fragmentation and conflict, especially
where the religious plurality is associated with cultural plurality.
A strategy commonly used to defuse this divisive potential has
been the exclusion of religion from the public education system. In
some cases, this has meant a total ban on the discussion of religion —
institutional exclusion — while in other cases it has meant the isola-
tion of religious discussion from the mainstream of the curriculum —
curricular isolation. 
Whilst this strategy has had some success in achieving its aim, it
is, in principle, both oppressive and a hindrance to rational discourse.
As Nord and Haynes point out (1998:3; 4), secular ways of interpre-
ting human experience are functionally indistinguishable from more
traditional religious interpretations. A strategy of exclusion or isola-
tion, therefore, effectively establishes one kind of religious interpre-
tation as the only valid one to the exclusion of all others in the main-
stream of learning (Nord & Haynes, 1998:6-9). 
To similar effect, in an analysis of the human phenomenon of re-
ligiousness, Wentz concludes (1987:13-21) that secular ways of giving
meaning to the world of human experience are as decisively expres-
sions of religiousness as are traditional religious interpretations. The
absence of the religious forms of traditional religions may disguise, but
does not diminish, the religious character of secular interpretations.
Toulmin's argument (1982:81-85) that scientific myths fulfil the same
function in the modern secular society as religious myths did in earlier
societies points in the same direction. 
The secularisation of education in modern societies, therefore, has
not removed the religious issues from education. It has simply esta-
blished one (secular) form of religious interpretation as the one autho-
rised interpretation in the curricular mainstream. The effect is op-
pressive in that, in the mainstream of learning, a privileged position is
given to one way of interpreting human experience to the exclusion of
the alternatives that exist within the society. 
It hinders rational discourse because it disguises, without in any
way diminishing, the role of religious-type understandings in human
perception of the experienced world. The privileging of one form of
understanding places a dogmatic constraint on rational discourse that
hinders rational consideration of the alternatives. 
This would be, in itself, sufficient ground for reviewing the way
in which religious plurality has commonly been dealt with in the pub-
lic education systems of modern secular societies. However, the chan-
ged scientific conception of order that has come from developments in
twentieth century physics and mathematics provides a powerful addi-
tional argument for such a review.
Throughout much of the nineteenth century and the first half of
the twentieth century, the scientific vision was of a world of predict-
able order and certainty in which, in principle, the rational procedures
of science could control events to ensure an increasingly happier and
more fruitful future. It was, for most, a satisfying vision giving the se-
curity and hope that has traditionally been provided by religion,
carrying with it all the authority that science had gained through its
many impressive achievements. 
As the new scientific perceptions of order slowly, yet surely,
filtered through to society at large, this scientific basis of security and
hope about life has been eroded. Science can no longer reassure us that
we live in a world of predictable order in which we have the means to
control events with any absolute certainty in order to secure an assured
future for ourselves and our children.
Some, such as the distinguished Cambridge physicist, Stephen
Hawking (1988:156; 167), continue to find hope in science. It is, how-
ever, a hope that is expressed in terms of probabilities rather than cer-
tainty and relies, in the end, not on any assured finding of science, but
on a religious faith in science as the means by which we can gain ac-
cess to "the ultimate laws of nature". Such a hope may be adequate for
him, and others like him, but for many it is not enough.
If the educational experience is to be meaningful to students in
today's world, therefore, and not be merely training for competent par-
ticipation in a sterile, meaningless world, we cannot afford to exclude
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religious issues from the curriculum. Kessler's study (2000) underlines
the practical importance of finding ways to include such issues if
educational institutions are to serve the needs of today's youth. 
With regard to public education systems, the challenge is to do
this in a way that neither violates the religious convictions of any nor
introduces divisive religious conflict into the learning environment.
Kessler's own approach (2000:x-xiv) is to encourage students to share
their personal experiences of the spiritual dimension, or inner life, in
a context that is detached from all particularities of  religious dogma
or world view. 
This approach has merit, and is worth including in any strategy
that may be adopted, but it is not, we suggest, adequate in itself. First-
ly, we question whether it is possible to deal with issues of spirituality
stripped of all particularities of religious faith and world view. It is
possible to do so without explicit reference to such matters but any
discussion of issues of spirituality will inevitably involve implicit
beliefs of a religious nature.  
Embedded in Kessler's description of her own strategy is the
implicit world view belief that answers to spiritual questions are vali-
dated by the experience of the individual. An answer is valid if it satis-
fies the individual's spiritual longings. This is an individualistic and
relativistic view of spirituality that, while acceptable to many, is also
challenged by others. 
The danger is that, because the strategy is declared by the teacher
to be free of particular religious assumptions, this most fundamental
assumption is likely to pass unnoticed by the students who will, never-
theless, be influenced by it through their participation in the learning
process.
Secondly, Kessler's approach does not go far enough in uncover-
ing for students the pervasive reality of religious faith. As Nord and
Haynes (1998:4) point out, religious faith cannot be compartmenta-
lised but has implications that extend to all of life. There is simply no
way to deal satisfactorily with issues of religious faith other than by
considering that faith in the fullness of its expression.
In the public education system of a plural society, this will need
to be done in a way that neither promotes nor endorses any one faith
but deals with all on equal terms. This requires, first of all, that we
define "religious" in a way that embraces all the diverse ways in which
human religiousness is expressed. Wentz' approach (1987:13) that
identifies religiousness with the human impulse to seek ultimate mea-
ning for life, whether it be in secular or traditional religious terms,
commends itself as a useful way to do this.
A second requirement is mutual openness in sharing the diverse
ways in which we express this common religiousness. On the one
hand, there must be openness for all to speak freely of the ways in
which they find meaning in the world, whether this is expressed in
traditional religious language or in secular language. On the other
hand, each must be open to listen to the other with a view to gaining
understanding of the other's experiences.
A third requirement is mutual acceptance of one another, with all
the diversity in our religious convictions. This need not mean either an
agreement with or an acknowledgement of the validity of the other's
convictions. To expect this would be asking many to deny their own
convictions. 
It does mean respect for the integrity of the other's convictions as
sincerely held beliefs about the answers to life's deepest issues. It does
mean renouncing all use of power, including pedagogical power, to
coerce another into accepting what we believe to be the right answers.
And it does mean looking together for ways in which, without blurring
the integrity of our diverse religious convictions, we can work
harmoniously together on the common problems that arise in our life
together in one society.
Bringing religious issues in this way into public education will
not only enrich the educational experience for all students in the most
fundamental way but will also do much to promote understanding and
harmony in the wider society. It is, we suggest, the most effective way
to defuse the explosive potential of religious, and cultural, plurality in
the modern society.
The same openness and acceptance should characterise the way
issues of religious plurality are dealt with in educational institutions
operated by religious communities in a plural society. These institu-
tions will desire, quite properly, to ensure that their educational prac-
tices are informed by their own religious faith. However, if they wish
to prepare their students for a constructive role in society, they must
equip them with an adequate understanding of the religious diversity
of a plural society together with an adequate basis for operating in
partnership with people of diverse religious faiths in addressing com-
mon problems. 
This cannot be done if other faiths are dealt with only in terms of
the polemics of the school's own faith. It can be achieved only through
the openness to and acceptance of religious plurality that is required
of the public education system. This does not require any compromise
or relativising of the school's own faith. It requires only openness to
and acceptance of the reality of the diversity of religious conviction
that is characteristic of the society of which the school is a part. In-
deed, it is only through this openness and acceptance that such a
school can prepare its students to participate in this society in the inte-
grity of their own faith.
A personal note 
The requirements of openness to and acceptance of religious plurality
in the pedagogical situation apply with equal force to the world of
academic discourse in a religiously plural society. At this point,
therefore, we want to articulate the nature of the religious faith that
informs our academic endeavours and the reasons for our confidence
that, without compromising the integrity of this faith, we can engage
in fruitful dialogue on common ground with colleagues who do not
share that faith. 
The world as creation: a perspective on order
The development of our views on order takes place within the per-
spective of the belief that the whole world of human experience, in all
its diversity, is the creation of God, in all of which we experience
God's presence. We do not find the natural/supernatural distinction
helpful since it implies that God's activity is confined to a supernatural
realm detached from the realm of nature.  We recognise God as wholly
distinct from, yet intimately involved with, the whole of our expe-
rienced world, the ordinary and everyday as much as the extraordinary
and unexpected. 
In conceptualising this relationship, we find it useful to speak (cf.
Fowler, 1991:27ff) of God as relating to all creation through an inter-
face that runs through the whole of human experience. Through this
interface God is in constant and intimate contact with creation, go-
verning it by his ordering Word, yet never merged with it. Also, by
means of this interface we humans, as God's image in creation, have
contact with God at every point of our daily existence. 
In consequence of this dynamic ordering of God, we expect the
world of human experience to exhibit an ordered constancy. At the
same time, as those who are always on the creaturely side of the inter-
face, we can claim no privileged access to any sort of divine blueprint
for the ordering of our world. Like everyone else, we can know the
patterns of order in creation only through our experiences of creation.
Our knowledge is always necessarily provisional, subject to correction
and modification as a result of extended experience of created reality.
On this basis, we gladly join with others who do not share our faith in
tracing the patterns of order in human experience, patterns that we re-
cognise as the result of the Creator's dynamic ordering activity. We
welcome the changes in the understanding of the nature of that order
that have come through twentieth century scientific investigations, as
an enrichment of our understanding of creational order and a correc-
tion to earlier, more limited, views of that order. 
We welcome, likewise, the challenge to review our conceptions
of educational order to ensure an educational practice that more ade-
quately equips students for the reality of life in this world. In the pro-
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cess of all this, we find that our understanding of God is enriched and
deepened. 
The world as creation: a perspective on chaos
As Letseka (1995), Spector (1993), Badenhorst (1995) and others have
convincingly argued, there is typically a measure of chaos, or what is
perceived as chaos, in society, and therefore also in education, during
times of transformation or revolution. We find it unsatisfactory, how-
ever, to regard this social chaos as a necessary prerequisite for, or
source of, social order. 
There are, we suggest, three very different sources for the expe-
rience of disorder in situations of major social change. 
The first is the uncertainty, disorientation and insecurity that ma-
ny people experience when moving from a familiar form of social or-
der into an unfamiliar one. In this case, the sense of chaos, while very
real and significant, is due to a subjective condition within those invol-
ved and not any disorder in the social context. 
A second source is an inevitable fluidity in the social order as a
new order is being constructed to replace the old. While this may, at
times, have a certain chaotic appearance, it is no more a genuine chaos
than is a building site during a process of demolition and recon-
struction. It is an orderly process of social reconstruction. This is,
perhaps, the closest thing in terms of social order to the "orderly dis-
order" of physics and chaos theory. Again the perception of disorder
is a subjective response to an orderly, but unfamiliar, reconstruction
process.
A third source is the violation of normative conditions in the hu-
man ordering activity, resulting in a disturbing disruption in human
relationships. This may be due to the actions of the revolutionary for-
ces of change, but it may also be due to features of the old order that
have left enduring distortions in human relationships that remain in
spite of fundamental changes in the formal social organisation. 
In this case only there is genuine chaos, in the sense of a break-
down in social order. It is not, however, and cannot be a source from
which a new order is generated. On the contrary, it is the result of the
violation of norms of social relationships that is a hindrance to the
establishment of that order. Order can only be established through
steadfast resistance of such anti-normative forces.
This brings us again to the problem of plurality in modern so-
cieties. It can hardly be disputed that social life is subject to norms.
We regularly make judgments about human societies that presume
such norms, judging one form of social order to be better than another,
and certain kinds of social arrangement to be unacceptable. The dif-
ficulty is that we do not always agree about what these norms are.
This lack of agreement about social norms is a significant source
of conflict, and even violence, in today's developed societies. On the
surface, the conflicts are commonly over practical issues such as the
environment, world trade, or social and economic policy. Yet, if we
look closely, it is clear that the fight is fuelled by different visions of
the good society, with the differences in social norms that these dif-
ferent visions entail. What one side in the dispute sees as being for the
good of society, the other side sees as a social evil.
The disputes can be resolved only if we resolve the differences
about the relevant social norms. This is no easy matter, since the dif-
fering visions of the good society are grounded in differences of reli-
gious faith. Any vision of the good society is necessarily grounded in
beliefs about the ultimate meaning of human life. On the broad defini-
tion of "religious" proposed earlier, such beliefs are clearly religious
in nature, even when expressed in secular language.
 If we are to deal in an effective way with the disruptive ten-
dencies of these differences over social norms, we must abandon the
notion that there is some set of universal social norms that are recog-
nised by all right-minded people. We must be open about the nor-
mative differences that inevitably exist in the modern plural society.
In our own case, we believe that there are universal norms for social
life that are grounded in the revelation of God in Christ. We see this
as an integral revelation experienced in three ways: in the experience
of the ordered contours of creation, in the person of Jesus Christ and
in the Christian scriptures. We believe that, in the final count, a society
is a good society only so far as it conforms to these universal norms.
At the same time, we recognise that, in a society characterised by re-
ligious pluralism, we cannot expect universal recognition of these
norms. We accept that, on some points at least, others will have dif-
ferent perceptions about social norms. And, even if it was possible, we
regard it as unacceptable to use the instruments of social power to
impose our norms on society, since it would inevitably be oppressive
of other communities in the society.
We propose, as the only effective way forward for achieving
social harmony in today's plural society, a process of open dialogue in
order to establish a consensus on the practical norms that are to govern
public life in the society. By consensus we do not mean a majority
decision but rather an agreement by all the diverse communal interests
in the society on norms that serve as a basis on which they can live
together in harmony and goodwill in the one society.
Such a process will require open dialogue in which each party is
free to present the case for what it sees as the right norms as vigorously
as they choose. Yet, the end result cannot be what any one party would
choose if its interests were the only ones involved. It can only be a
common ground that all can accept as sufficient for living together,
without oppression, in one society. The only alternative to such con-
sensus-building dialogue, it seems to us, is social oppression, through
the imposition on all of the norms of one section of society, or social
disintegration as a result of a normative vacuum.
Educational institutions can make a fundamental contribution to
this process in three ways. Firstly, they can promote understanding and
acceptance of the normative diversity of society. Secondly, they can
encourage students to articulate and explore the foundations of their
own beliefs about social norms. And thirdly, they can initiate students
into a constructive process of consensus-building through open dia-
logue. 
In Conclusion
We have little, if any, control over chaos and order in the physical
world. We can only work with the world as it is in order to achieve the
optimum results for our purposes. On the other hand, the social world,
including the world of education, is a world of our making. Changing
patterns in our knowledge of the physical world, and rapidly changing
social patterns, demand creative change in the way we order education
if our educational practice is to remain effective in preparing students
for tomorrow's world.
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Social change, educational change, physical sciences, cultural plura-
lism, religious differences, learning strategies
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